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“Forceable extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the 
judicial mind. Such would raise the spectre of the swastika and the 
Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this portends.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the twentieth century, medical breakthroughs made it 
possible for humans to exchange certain diseased organs for healthy 
 
* J.D. University of Oregon School of Law, 2011. The author would like to thank 
Simone Heri of the UNODC Anti-Human Trafficking Unit for her encouragement and 
support on this article, as well as Beth Guadagni and Jason Tashea for their valuable 
contributions and insight. Finally, to my parents for their steadfast commitment to the 
unwanted, unloved, and uncared for. 
1 McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 92 (C.P. Ct. Allegheny Co. 1978) (quoting 
Judge Flaherty). 
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ones, dramatically extending lives. As technology improved and 
became more widespread, the need for healthy organs began to 
outstrip supply.2 Topics on the fringe of medical ethics burst onto the 
scene as market-based solutions for the growing organ shortage crisis 
were proposed and met with fierce opposition. In response to the 
growing fear of the human body becoming a “commodity,” legislation 
in the United States was quickly passed to prevent organ sales and the 
emergence of a black market.3 Ironically, this accelerated the shortage 
of organs and the emergence of a global black market in organ 
procurement. Driving this black market are factors of desperation and 
deception. Wealthy citizens of countries with robust procurement 
systems skirt their domestic system by travelling overseas to receive 
transplantation procedures. Known as “transplant tourism,” these 
individuals are able to dodge long wait times for domestic organs by 
paying top dollar to foreign medical organizations for transplants.4 In 
the midst of this transaction are third-world “donors” who are 
deceived and defrauded into supplying their organs, usually a kidney. 
Recently, the Council of Europe has suggested that the solution to 
organ trafficking and human trafficking for organ removal is an 
internationally binding agreement outlawing organ sales worldwide.5 
However, the current realities of the illicit transplantation market and 
the past lessons of procurement systems based solely on altruism 
seem to suggest that a new internationally binding agreement would 
not only be useless, but may prevent real solutions to the organ crisis 
from being thoroughly explored. Moreover, an internationally binding 
convention already exists, which could be easily adapted to address 
the transplant tourism problem and provide enough flexibility to 
explore meaningful procurement solutions: the Additional Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (Trafficking Protocol).6 The 
 
2 CAPLAN ET AL., COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND UNITED NATIONS, TRAFFICKING IN 
ORGANS, TISSUES AND CELLS AND TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF THE REMOVAL OF ORGANS, 20 (Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal 
Affairs: Council of Europe 2009) [hereinafter COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY]. 
3 See National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2008). 
4 K.A. Bramstedt & Jun Xu, Checklist: Passport, Plane Ticket, Organ Transplant, 7 
AM. J. OF TRANSPLANTATION 1698, 1698 (2007). 
5 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 94. 
6 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (Nov. 15, 2000); 2237 U.N.T.S. 
319. [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol]. 
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Trafficking Protocol is widely ratified and requires member states to 
criminalize, among other activities,  organ removal procured by 
deceit, fraud, and coercion.7 Through this instrument, transplant 
tourism could be classified as an act that promotes human trafficking 
for organ removal, thus member states should criminalize it to comply 
with the Trafficking Protocol. Realistically, this approach should be 
vigorously pursued by the wealthier states whose citizens drive the 
illicit transplantation market through their demand because such states 
are better positioned to enforce effective bans on transplant tourism. 
The purpose of this Note is not to take a definitive position on the 
procurement debate, but to encourage the debate domestically by 
shutting down transplant tourism. This Note explores the need to 
close the loopholes in wealthy “recipient” countries in order to force 
domestic reform and dry up demand in poorer “donor” countries. Part 
I of this Note shows the progression of medical breakthroughs 
surrounding organ transplantation and the subsequent rise of the 
international black market. Part II explores the international 
legislative and normative response to perceived ethical puzzles raised 
by the growing prevalence of transplantation procedures, as well as 
the current debate on the appropriateness of altruism and market-
based procurement approaches. Part III responds to the call for an 
internationally binding instrument that would solidify altruism as the 
backbone of organ procurement, instead proposing a model law based 
on the Trafficking Protocol to address the growing abuses in 
transplant tourism and human trafficking for organ removal. 
I 
TRANSPLANTATION: BREAKTHROUGH AND BLACK MARKET 
A.  Organ Transplantation 
The transplantation of human organs and tissues is a relatively 
contemporary breakthrough in medical science. Removing an organ 
from one person and surgically transplanting it into another, referred 
to as a “graft,” was likely considered either ghoulish or science fiction 
for most of the twentieth century. Doctors had experimented with 
 
7 Id. at art. 5. Article 3 of the Trafficking Protocol defines human trafficking as: “the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring [sic] or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation.” Id. at art. 3(a). Exploitation includes “the removal 
of organs.” Id. 
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transplanting organs from one animal to another living one of the 
same species with little success, a procedure known as an “allograft.”8 
However, on December 23, 1954, Dr. Joseph Murray and colleagues 
performed a living related-donor kidney transplant between two 
brothers in Hollywood, Florida.9 Because the brothers were identical 
twins, kidney graft rejection was not an issue and the brothers were 
released in good health several weeks later.10 This kidney transplant 
was a major breakthrough, and proved that it was now possible to 
replace diseased organs with healthy ones. But without 
immunosuppressant drugs, the promise of transplantation for diseased 
organs was limited to identical twins.11 
This changed in 1963, with the development of Azathioprine, a 
drug that could modify the immune response of rejection, thus 
allowing renal transplantation between non-identical living related 
donors.12 The combination of Prednisone and Azathioprine became a 
cornerstone of organ transplantation, expanding the procedure’s 
availability to related non-identical donor populations.13 The 
introduction of Cyclosporin A in 1983 had a massive impact on the 
availability of both cadaveric and living allograft transplantations.14 
Organ transplantation was now a very real possibility for a broad 
range of individuals suffering from organ failure. Current medical 
technology and the acceptance of “brain death” have broadened 
transplantation procedures to include cadaveric and non-related living 
donors.15 
Twenty-nine years after the creation of Cyclosporin A, organ 
transplantation has become widely available and success rates of 
 
8 Allograft Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com (“A graft 
between genetically dissimilar individuals of the same species.”) (last visited Nov. 4, 
2011); see also Arnold G. Diethelm, Ethical Decisions in the History of Organ 
Transplantation, 211 ANN. SURG. 505, 506–07 (May 1990). 
9 See Diethelm, supra note 8, at 507. 
10 Id. (“graft” is a common medical term for a transplanted organ). 
11 Id. at 507–08. 
12 Id. at 509. 
13 Id. at 510. 
14 Id. at 510–11. Cyclosporin A is a powerful immunosuppressant that drastically 
improves long-term graft survival. Since then, other treatments to prevent allograft 
rejection have also emerged (such as antilymphocyte globulin and a monoclonal antibody). 
Id. at 511. Cadaveric organs are from deceased individuals (cadavers). 
15 Id. at 511–15. However, the expansion of “brain death” definitions introduces 
significant technical, ethical, and legal questions that countries will have to grapple with, 
but are beyond the scope of this paper. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 
27. 
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kidney transplant procedures are excellent.16 Advances in organ 
preservation, immunosuppression, xenografting, and surgical 
technology continue to expand the frontiers of transplantation. 
Despite these successes, organ transplantation remains a very risky 
and complicated procedure. The most difficult aspect of the 
transplantation process is the procurement of an acceptable organ. 
Once blood ceases to flow to the organ due to severance of arteries or 
death, the organ begins to deteriorate rapidly from the lack of oxygen. 
The transplantation process must take place in a very short period of 
time because organs with long ischemic periods become unsuitable 
for transplantation.17 Furthermore, organ donation and procurement is 
a complex process that requires highly trained professionals working 
together, a process that can be disrupted at any time.18 The 
immunosuppression necessary to prevent the body from rejecting the 
grafted organ is an imperfect solution and over time, “grafts are lost 
mainly due to the widely known phenomenon of ‘chronic rejection’ 
and death with a functioning graft.”19 The main causes of death 
resultant from transplants are due to diseases associated with long-
term use of immunosuppression, which is necessary for the vast 
majority of transplant patients.20 
Every organ recipient has to be successfully “matched” to a 
compatible donor to ensure organ survival. The matching process 
ensures that the donor and recipient are similar enough 
physiologically for the recipient’s body to accept the new organ; if 
not, the recipient’s body will reject the organ and attack it, leading to 
graft failure and further complications. Immunosuppression assists in 
this transition, but the two parties must still be precisely matched to 
ensure long-term graft survival. 
 
16 According to 2009 data, three-year graft survival rates from deceased and living 
kidney donors were eighty percent and eighty-nine percent respectively.  Three-year 
patient (recipient) survival rates from deceased and living donors were eighty-nine percent 
and ninety-five percent respectively. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 2009 
ANN. REP. OF THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK & THE 
SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS: TRANSPLANT DATA 1999–2008, 
Table 1.13 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 ANN. REP.]. 
17 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 25. Ischemia is the deficient supply of 
blood to an organ, which leads to tissue degeneration. See Ischemia Definition, Medline 
Plus, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/medlineplus 
/ischemia (last visited Nov. 4, 2011). 
18 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
19 Id. at 19. 
20 Id. 
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Donated organs can come from either live donors (only for kidneys 
or livers) or deceased donors (cadaveric). Each source has its own 
procurement difficulties. First, with live donors there is the inherent 
risk of patients paying another for their organ. Currently, most 
transplantation regulatory regimes are founded upon the principle of 
altruism, where it is illegal to buy or sell a bodily organ. The merits of 
such a system will be discussed in Part II. The rationale for this policy 
is that allowing market transactions for organs would lead to 
exploitation of the poor and degradation of human dignity. Thus, an 
altruistic system requires donors to give freely, and voluntary live 
donors can be hard to come by. Most regimes also require live donors 
to be either an immediate relative or someone who shares a close 
connection to the recipient. 
Next, cadaveric organ procurement systems operate on altruism as 
well, but also face difficulties associated with the tissue degeneration 
problems discussed above. Coordination of cadaveric donation 
requires rapid identification, matching, and transplantation. These 
needs led to definitions of “brain death,” as well as the development 
of “opt-in” or “opt-out” consent systems.21 An opt-in system operates 
under the presumption that an individual does not want to be an organ 
donor unless he has made an affirmative statement to the contrary. 
The United States currently operates under such a system.22 
Alternatively, the opt-out or presumed consent system presents 
difficult ethical wrinkles. In an opt-out system, consent for organ 
donation is presumed unless an individual affirmatively states 
otherwise. Popular in Europe, this system is widely endorsed by the 
European transplantation community, but its superior effectiveness is 
far from apparent.23 Presumed consent laws may also have difficulty 
being accepted in some countries.24 It is not uncommon for countries 
with presumed consent laws to still regularly ask family members for 
consent, respecting their decisions to the contrary.25 
Finally, compounding the organ procurement difficulties are the 
biases between the differing systems. Scientifically, a living donor 
transplant is more desirable because it is an elective procedure that 
can be scheduled more effectively and has superior graft survival 
 
21 Erica D. Roberts, When the Storehouse is Empty, Unconscionable Contracts Abound: 
Why Transplant Tourism Should Not Be Ignored, 52 HOW. L.J. 747, 751 (2009). 
22 Id. at 752. 
23 Id. at 761. 
24 Id. at 760. 
25 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 24. 
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rates.26 However, in the current system based purely on altruism, it is 
difficult to incentivize greater donation rates.27 Alternatively, 
cadaveric donations are less susceptible exploitive arrangements,28 
but they suffer from lower graft quality, complicated logistical 
considerations, and cultural barriers.29 
B.  Growth of the Black Market 
Regardless of its imperfections, organ transplantation is now a 
global practice with kidney transplants carried out in more than ninety 
countries.30 Approximately 100,800 solid-organ transplants are 
performed every year worldwide, including 69,400 kidney transplants 
and 20,200 liver transplants.31 Furthermore, forty-six percent of 
transplanted kidneys come from living donors.32 The increasing 
prevalence of transplantation has caused a shortage of organs to 
emerge (and death rates to increase) and this shortage has caused 
some individuals to look to private, commercial organ transactions.33 
For example, in 1983, Dr. H. Berry Jacobs proposed that the 
solution for organ supply shortages could be establishing an 
International Kidney Exchange and allowing organ sales through that 
exchange.34 This sparked vehement condemnation from individuals 
 
26 Id. at 27–29; see also 2009 ANN. REP., supra note 16, Table 1.13. 
27 Sunny Woan, Buy Me a Pound of Flesh: China’s Sale of Death Row Organs on the 
Black Market and What Americans Can Learn From It, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 413, 
424–25 (2007); see also Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To Solve a Deadly 
Shortage: Economic Incentives for Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES L. & MED. 213, 
223 (2001); Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 219 
(2000). 
28 Robert D. Truog, The Ethics of Organ Donation by Living Donors, 353 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 444, 445 (2005) (directed donation to a stranger has an inherent risk of being the 
product of a commercial transaction, even though such practices are illegal). 
29 See 2009 ANN. REP., supra note 16 at Table 1.13. In some regions, such as Africa, 
Asia, and South America, there is strong resistance to using cadaveric organs for various 
cultural, personal, and financial reasons. See Clare Nullis-Kapp, Organ Trafficking and 
Transplantation Pose New Challenges, 82 BULL. OF THE WHO 715, 715 (2004). 
30 See generally Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: a 
Provisional Picture Based on Integration of Available Information, 85 BULL. OF THE 
WHO 955, 955–62 (2007). 
31 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), GKT 1 Activity and Practices, 
http://www.who.int/transplantation/gkt/statistics/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2011) 
(based on activity data analyzed from 2008 for 104 countries, representing nearly ninety 
percent of the worldwide population). 
32 Id. 
33 Roberts, supra note 21, at 749. 
34 Id. at 762. (Dr. Jacob’s company would have purchased kidneys from healthy, but 
very poor Third World citizens and sold them to wealthy American recipients); see also  
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and lawmakers who believed that such a system would negate 
altruism, exploit the underprivileged, reduce the quality of organs, 
and degrade the human body by reducing it to a commodity.35 
Ironically, opponents also believed that such a market system would 
open the door to organ commerce and a black market for organ 
trading.36 These criticisms were accepted around the world, and in 
1984, the United States responded to Dr. Jacob’s proposal by passing 
the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) with other nations 
following suit.37 NOTA passed with little debate and made it 
“unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise 
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human 
transplantation.”38 Thus, altruism was solidified as the only 
acceptable foundation for transplantation in the United States and 
abroad.39 
Since the 1980s, increasing shortages in organs globally has 
developed into a major problem for most countries.40 For example, in 
2008 the United States added 33,051 new registrations to the kidney 
waiting list and had 139,917 patients on the waiting list for all 
organs.41 That year, 7182 patients died while waiting and 4638 of 
those were waiting for a kidney.42 In 2005, the median wait for a 
kidney transplant was approximately three and a half years.43 In 2006, 
it was estimated that approximately 40,000 Europeans were on kidney 
 
Jennifer M. Smith, “Dirty Pretty Things” and the Law: Curing the Organ Shortage & 
Healthcare Crises in America, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 361, 369 (2008). 
35 Roberts, supra note 21, at 763; see also Smith, supra note 34, at 370 (stating that 
“Americans were outraged” and pressured Congress to ban the sale of organs—an 
initiative spearheaded by Senator Al Gore). 
36 Roberts, supra note 21, at 763. 
37 National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2008); see also 
Roberts, supra note 21, at 764; Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994, No. 42, Acts 
of Parliament, 1994 (India); Human Organ Transplant Act, 1989, c. 31 (Eng.); Human 
Tissue Amendment Act 51 of 1989 (S. Afr.). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 274e; see also Roberts, supra note 21, at 764. 
39 See Andrew Wancata, No Value for a Pound of Flesh: Extending Market-
Inalienability of the Human Body, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 200 (2004) (noting that in the 
United States and many countries throughout the world, selling non-regenerative organs 
for monetary gain constitutes a serious criminal offense); see also Jeneen Interlandi, Not 
Just Urban Legend, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 2009 at 41. 
40 Roberts, supra note 21, at 757. 
41 2009 ANN. REP., supra note 16, at Tables 1.5 & 1.6. (finding that in 2008, 99,750 
patients were waiting for a kidney). 
42 Id. at Table 1.6. 
43 Id. at Table 1.5. 
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waiting lists and fifteen to thirty percent of them would die while 
waiting.44 
The shortage of organs is primarily the result of longer lifespans, 
more reliable and available transplantation procedures, detrimental 
changes in diet and lifestyle, and the need for retransplantation 
procedures for previous recipients.45 Others have pointed to the 
prohibition of organ sales as the major force driving organ scarcity.46 
Regardless of the cause, the supply of organ donors has never been 
enough to meet the increasing demand,47 and an international black 
market in living donor kidney transplantation has emerged.48 
The shortage of “indigenous” supplies of organs has created an 
international organ trade, where patients travel overseas to take 
advantage of regulatory loopholes.49 Recipients are assisted by 
intermediaries or healthcare providers who arrange the procedure and 
recruit the donor.50 Black markets are especially prevalent in poorer 
regions largely due to the extreme poverty, desperation, long waiting 
lists, and the fact that higher quality organs come from living 
donors.51 The vulnerable poor and desperate rich come together in 
black market transactions, spurred by advances in technology and 
lagging international legislation.52 However, these black market 
transactions are rife with insufficient information, no remedies in the 
event of fraud, and deadly combinations of desperation and greed.53 
 
44 Silke Meyer, Trafficking in Human Organs in Europe: A Myth or an Actual Threat?, 
14 EUR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 208, 218 (2006). 
45 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 20. 
46 Liliana M. Kalogjera, New Means of Increasing the Transplant Organ Supply: 
Ethical and Legal Issues, 34 HUM. RTS. 19, 20 (2007) (“[Although] the prohibition may be 
ethically justified, [it] has likely contributed, at least in part, to the growing shortage.”); 
see also Michele Goodwin, Bio Law: A Few Thoughts About Altruism and Markets, 18 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 208, 209 (2009) (“[A] rigid prescription on altruism inspires the 
least favorable of markets: black and gray markets.”). 
47 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 20. 
48 Smith, supra note 34, at 372. However, as early as the 1970s, medical professionals 
predicted that the rising value of human body parts coupled with shortages would drive 
organ procurement into the underground market. See RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS 
PROPERTY, 181 (1981). 
49 Shimazono, supra note 30, at 955. 
50 Id. at 956. 
51 Smith, supra note 34, at 374. 
52 Joe A. Flores, International Scientific Misconduct and the Legal System, 9 
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 60, 65 (2000). 
53 Roberts, supra note 21, at 767 (explaining that in the event of fraud disputes, the 
donor is usually left with no recourse). 
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Being that the current “legal” human tissue industry is estimated to 
be worth $500 million a year,54 the incentives associated with the 
organ trade are irresistible for organized crime and human trafficking. 
Human trafficking for organ removal is characterized by cases in 
which people enter into an agreement to sell their organ, but once the 
kidney is removed, they are cheated, paid a fraction of the agreed 
price, or not paid at all.55 Organized crime serves as a middleman that 
coerces poor individuals to sell their organs through either economic 
incentives or force.56 Both brokers and medical staff frequently lie 
about the procedure and its consequences.57 
Organized crime can be classified into two categories: one 
characterized by the provision of goods and services between 
consenting parties, and the other characterized by the abuse or 
infiltration of legitimate businesses through threats, coercion, or 
violence.58 Silke Meyer classifies trafficking in human organs as 
falling into the first category because the transaction is often based on 
mutual consent.59 Generally, those donating their organs on the black 
market are lured, not forced, into selling their organs.60 The brokers 
pay only $1,000 to $5,000 to the donor, but sell the organ to recipients 
for hundreds of thousands of dollars.61 
Medical professionals are complicit in this trafficking because the 
black market for organ transplantations requires highly skilled 
medical staff, intermediaries or brokers to seek out donors (usually 
from poor communities), and well-paying clients.62 Additionally, 
 
54 Alan Zarembo & Jessica Garrison, Profit Drives Illegal Trade in Body Parts, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A1. See also Martina Keller & Markus Grill, Inside a Creepy 
Global Body Parts Business, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de 
/international/Europe/0,1518,645375,00.html (Euro currency conversion omitted) (“If a 
body were disassembled into its individual parts, then processed and sold, the total 
proceeds could amount to $250,000.”). 
55 ELAINE PEARSON, COERCION IN THE KIDNEY TRADE?: A BACKGROUND STUDY ON 
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN ORGANS WORLDWIDE 10–11 (2004) (explaining that averages 
are about one-third less than the promised price). 
56 Id. at 10. 
57 Id. 
58 Meyer, supra note 44, at 212. 
59 Id. “[T]he ones operating this business are often suspected to have excellent 
connections to official authorities.” Id. at 220. 
60 Id. at 221. 
61 Id. Some estimates put possible sales at prices between $100,000 to $200,000.  See 
Council of Europe, Trafficking in Organs in Europe: Report of the Social, Health and 
Family Affairs Committee § II, no. 11 (2003); Nullis-Kapp, supra note 29, at 715. 
62 Meyer, supra note 44, at 211. In Taiwan, “118 patients who underwent organ 
transplants in China were questioned by their Department of Health, and 69 reported that 
their transplants were facilitated by doctors.” See also Shimazono, supra note 30, at 956. 
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unlike other forms of trafficking, the transplantation procedure cannot 
take place just anywhere, as it requires a medical facility with all the 
necessary equipment.63 In some countries, these medical officials and 
brokers are directly linked with government officials.64 
Governments themselves have turned to nefarious action in an 
effort to curb their own domestic organ shortages or cash in on the 
lucrative market. In an effort to solve its organ procurement problem, 
China began harvesting organs from executed prisoners for immediate 
transplantation into paying clients.65 In 2006, approximately 11,000 of 
the transplants done in China were with organs from executed 
prisoners.66 There are even reports that China purposely adjusted 
execution schedules to coincide with the matching requirements of 
potential recipients.67 Although China has taken strides to reform 
these practices, some observers believe the efforts were merely a 
public relations stunt for the 2008 Olympics and will soon recede to 
previous practices.68 Recently, reports have emerged of government 
officials in Kosovo being directly involved in the trafficking and 
execution of Serb prisoners for organ harvesting.69 Working in 
connection with organized crime syndicates, Serb prisoners were 
taken into neighboring Albania where medical personnel were waiting 
to harvest the prisoners’ organs for transplantation procedures.70 
The growing prevalence of overseas medical procedures has 
contributed to illicit practices. Most medical tourists are drawn 
overseas by significant cost-savings and comparable standards of 
 
63 Meyer, supra note 44, at 211. 
64 Id. at 220 (“[T]he ones operating this business are often suspected to have excellent 
connections to official authorities.”). 
65 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHINA: ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND 
JUDICIAL EXECUTION IN CHINA (1994); see also Roberts, supra note 21, at 771–72. 
66 D.A. Budiani-Saberi & F.L. Delmonico, Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism: 
A Commentary on the Global Realities, 8 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 925, 927 (2008). 
67 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 65; see also Roberts, supra note 
21, at 772 n.189. 
68 Budiani-Saberi & Delmonico, supra note 66, at 928. 
69 Julia Zebley, Council of Europe Demands Kosovo, Albania Investigate Organ 
Trafficking, JURIST (2011), available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/01/council-of      
-europe-demands-kosovo-albania-investigate-organ-trafficking.php; Paul Lewis, Kosovo 
PM is Head of Human Organ and Arms Ring, Council of Europe Reports, GUARDIAN 
(London) (2010), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/14/kosovo         
-prime-minister-llike-mafia-boss. 
70 See Lewis, supra note 69. 
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treatment at accredited facilities.71 Medical tourism brokerages 
frequently note the quality of care provided by western-trained or 
licensed medical facilities and their international accreditation by the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation for Healthcare Organizations 
through its affiliate, Joint Commission International.72 There are over 
123 medical facilities worldwide that are accredited by this 
organization, and several of them are partnered with major western 
teaching facilities such as Harvard Medical International, the Mayo 
Clinic, and Johns Hopkins Medicine International.73 It is estimated 
that in 2003, nearly 350,000 patients from developed countries 
traveled to developing countries for health care, and that number is 
projected to grow to approximately 10.5 to 23.2 million by 2017.74 
Cost analyses of surgical procedures for non-acute health problems 
estimated the annual savings to be approximately $1.4 billion.75 The 
promise of globalized healthcare has caused both public and private 
entities to explore ways to incentivize employees’ use of medical 
tourism.76 Though not necessarily unethical,77 travel for medical care 
can quickly devolve into illicit practices when transplantation is 
involved.78 Approximately ten percent of global transplants involve 
illicit practices.79 Insurance companies, medical professionals, and 
 
71 Laura Hopkins et al., Medical Tourism Today: What is the State of Existing 
Knowledge?, 31 J. OF PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 185, 189 (2010); see also Shimazono, supra 
note 30, at 955–62; Leigh Turner, ‘Medical Tourism’ Initiatives Should Exclude 
Commercial Organ Transplantation, 101 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 391–94 (2008). 
72 Hopkins et al., supra note 71, at 187. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 187–88. 
75 Id. at 189. 
76 In 2007, a U.S. company offered financial inducements for employees to receive 
medical treatment in India and West Virginia attempted to implement a similar policy for 
state employees. However, both programs failed due to condemnation and concerns over 
lax medical malpractice laws. Hopkins et al., supra note 71, at 189. A European-owned 
supermarket chain in the United States successfully implemented such a policy in order to 
deal with the high cost of U.S. healthcare. Id. Belgium considered legislation that would 
create a list of non-European hospitals that were ethically acceptable for transplantation 
and any foreign transplant not from these hospitals would face a fine (500–5000 euro). 
Bramstedt & Xu, supra note 4, at 1699. 
77 “However, not all medical tourism that entails the travel of transplant recipients or 
donors across national borders is organ trafficking. Transplant tourism may be legal and 
appropriate.” Budiani-Saberi & Delmonico, supra note 66, at 926; see also Francis L. 
Delmonico, The Implications of Istanbul Declaration on Organ Trafficking and 
Transplant Tourism, 14 CURR. OPIN. ORGAN TRANSPLANT. 116, 117 (2009). 
78 Hopkins et al., supra note 71, at 190; see also Shimazono, supra note 30, at 955–62; 
Turner, supra note 71, at 391–94. 
79 Delmonico, supra note 77, at 116; see also Budiani-Saberi & Delmonico, supra note 
66, at 927. 
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private firms all facilitate this practice with little or no danger of 
prosecution.80 Companies, such as United Group Programs, offer 
living and deceased donor transplants at their referral facility in 
Bangkok, Thailand. Euphemistically referred to as “medical value 
travel,” U.S. health insurers work with corporations to arrange for 
American employees to obtain living donor transplants in India, 
though the living donor is identified in America and flown with the 
recipient to the overseas facility.81 
Concerns over transplant tourism highlight the possibility of 
exploitation because “in countries where transplantation guidelines do 
not exist (or are not enforced), the source of donor organs can be 
people who have been expressly paid to donate, as well as those who 
are unable to give valid informed consent.”82 More often than not, it is 
the desperately impoverished who are approached by intermediaries 
with promises of financial freedom—promises that are rarely kept.83 
Most of these donors receive little or no follow-up treatment, a 
fraction of the promised price, and experience serious health 
complications.84 As one panel of experts stated: “The majority of 
these [commercial living-donors] (93%) who sold a kidney to repay a 
debt and (85%) reported no economic improvement in their lives, as 
they were either still in debt or were unable to achieve their objective 
in selling the kidney . . . [n]inety-four percent regretted their 
donation.”85 The most unfortunate aspect of transplant tourism is not 
desperate donors doing anything to meet their needs, but the desperate 
patient willing to do anything to survive.86 
Domestically, transplant tourism presents new dangers and 
burdens. Preliminary research with patients who received 
 
80 See generally Bramstedt & Xu, supra note 4. 
81 Id. at 1698–99. 
82 Id. at 1699. 
83 See PEARSON, supra note 55, at 10–11; see also Roberts, supra note 21, at 782–83. 
84 Smith, supra note 34, at 375–76; Jeffrey P. Kahn, Studying Organ Sales: Short Term 
Profits, Long Term Suffering, CNN HEALTH, http://articles.cnn.com/2002-10-01/health 
/ethics.matters.selling.organs_1_kidney-donors-organ-sales-organ-donors?_s=PM 
:HEALTH (last visited Feb. 24, 2011); Shimazono, supra note 30, at 958 (“[T]he 
underlying motivation of most paid kidney donors is poverty, and . . . lasting economic 
benefit after donation is limited or even negative because of the limited employability of 
such patients and the perceived deterioration of their health.”). 
85 Budiani-Saberi & Delmonico, supra note 66, at 927–28 (the responses were 
consistent across studies in Pakistan, Egypt, India, Iran, and the Philippines). 
86 Aslihan Sanal, “Robin Hood” of Techno-Turkey or Organ Trafficking in the State of 
Ethical Beings, 28 CULTURE, MED. & PSYCHIATRY 281, 305 (2004). 
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transplantation procedures found high occurrences of botched 
procedures and infections, including hepatitis B, fungal sepsis, and 
HIV.87 Due to substandard medical practices, patient and graft 
survival rates are considerably lower.88 Finally, medical records for 
these patients are often incomplete or unobtainable, further 
complicating follow-up treatment and placing the public at risk.89 
Physicians who would normally never be involved in the illicit 
practice are now forced to bear the responsibility for the medical care 
of those who skirt the system and return home with medical 
complications and possible infectious diseases.90 In the United States, 
current federal law presents no obstacles to patients returning home 
and receiving post-transplantation care, further encouraging the 
practice.91 
“Organs,” under the most basic definition, are not the only locus of 
controversy; a variety of tissues and cells are routinely implanted for 
a wide range of procedures.92 Some of these tissues are corneas, heart 
valves, bone, dura matter, joints and tendons, skin, and fat.93 In this 
context, observers point to the rising instances of scientific 
misconduct in the biotechnology industry regarding human organs, 
tissues, and cells.94 American courts have been reticent to recognize 
property rights regarding one’s bodily tissues, bestowing, at best, a 
“quasi-property” right.95 The landmark case in this instance is Moore 
v. Regents of the University of California, where tissues were 
removed from the plaintiff during treatment of hairy cell leukemia 
 
87 Bramstedt & Xu, supra note 4, at 1700 (internal citations omitted). 
88 Shimazono, supra note 30, at 958. 
89 Bramstedt & Xu, supra note 4, at 1700. 
90 Budiani-Saberi & Delmonico, supra note 66, at 925. 
91 Shimazono, supra note 30, at 958; Francis L. Delmonico et al., Ethical Incentives—
Not Payment—for Organ Donation, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2002, 2002 (2002). 
92 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 17. 
93 Id. 
94 See generally Flores, supra note 52; Keller & Grill, supra note 54. 
95 Courts associated a quasi-property right to one’s body, but this approach has never 
been generally accepted “[b]ecause this quasi-property right is neither pecuniary in nature 
nor transferable, it falls well short of conferring true property rights” Lisa Milot, What Are 
We—Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts? The Tax Treatment of Transfers of Human 
Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1084 (2010) (citations omitted); see also 
Wancata, supra note 39, at 205–06; Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 
1991); O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899). But see Venner v. Maryland, 354 
A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (holding that defendant possibly had a property right 
to his own excrement, but he had legally abandoned that property); Hecht v. Superior 
Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing a narrow interpretation of 
property rights to human cells). 
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and, without the plaintiff’s knowledge, were developed into a 
patented cell line of substantial monetary value.96 While the court did 
not expressly address whether or not the human body or its parts are 
property, its holding for the defendants was essentially a “statement 
that the law treats human tissues, organs, blood, and dead bodies as 
objects sui generis—physical objects not within the parameters of 
traditional personal property.”97 Furthermore, some laws distinguish 
organs and body “products” on the grounds that removal of 
regenerative tissue (gametes and blood) pose little hazard to a donor’s 
life and health, so sales are allowable.98 
Although profiting from human parts is expressly prohibited in 
most countries, companies have exploited loopholes in the system for 
massive financial gain. As one observer opined; “Over the last 
decade, the tissue and organ bank industries have boomed. These 
institutions are considered nonprofit, and donors envision their parts 
being used only in altruistic endeavors. But many such banks, closely 
tied to for-profit companies, essentially sell body parts for 
commercial research and products.”99 Most tissues undergo 
processing where they are turned into “products” that are sold to 
hospitals; this conversion process accounts for most of the 
controversy surrounding tissue donation.100 
Many tissue banks are for-profit organizations.101 Although NOTA 
prohibits the buying and selling of organs and tissues, the Act allows 
organ banks to charge “reasonable fees” for their services.102 These 
“reasonable fees” allow for-profit companies to enter the procurement 
process.103 Utilizing the altruism of organ donors or express consent 
programs, or offering compensation in cases such as gametes, these 
companies are able to commoditize human parts for sale in 
“legitimate” markets.104 In many cases, the exploitation arises when 
 
96 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
97 Wancata, supra note 39, at 210; see also Moore, 739 P.2d at 489. 
98 Wancata, supra note 39, at 223. 
99 Zarembo & Garrison, supra note 54. 
100 Vanessa S. Perlman, Reviews in Medical Ethics: The Place of Altruism in a Raging 
Sea of Market Commerce, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 163, 164 (2005). 
101 Id. 
102 National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–74 (1984); see also 
Perlman, supra note 100, at 164. 
103 Perlman, supra note 100, at 164. 
104 Financial exchanges occur on a regular basis in the transplantation industry with 
biopharmaceutical companies engaging in a wide array of partnerships, including 
arrangements with university hospitals, coroners, and abortion clinics. Woan, supra note  
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these companies and practitioners fail to disclose the intended use of 
the tissue to the donor.105 Other cases emerge from presumed consent 
cases where cadavers are simply harvested for their tissue by a 
coroner or other medical professional in contract with a biotech 
company or organ bank.106 Observers point out that a prevailing 
“benevolent” view of the scientific community shields them from 
criticism,107 while they exploit altruism for entities that “pursue their 
financial interests aggressively.”108 While some fear that demanding 
altruism throughout the entire donation process would severely 
cripple medical research and advancement,109 there certainly is a 
growing need for regulations to prevent large companies from 
profiting from donor ignorance or outright fraud. 
Over the last century or so of medical advances, illicit and free 
markets emerged for human materials, but until recently those 
materials had limited economic value.110 During the course of the past 
several decades, the revolution in medical technology has 
dramatically increased the economic potential of the human body.111 
“These dramatic technological breakthroughs have escalated the 
tension between preventing (or at least containing) the 
commodification of human body parts on the one hand and providing 
services that save and enhance human lives on the other.”112 Although 
commercialization of human organs is technically prohibited in the 
United States and a majority of other nations, global disparities in 
policy and enforcement have allowed a black market in organ 
transactions to emerge and flourish.113 Due to “the extreme levels of 
poverty in some regions, Americans and others have procured organs 
from living donors in many Third World countries with no real long-
 
27, at 426; see also Michele Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ 
Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 327–28 (2004). 
105 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
106 Goodwin, supra note 46, at 211. See generally Albrecht v. Treon, 889 N.E.2d 120 
(Ohio 2008) (Albrecht II); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991); Organ 
Scandal Background, BBC NEWS (2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1136723.stm. 
107 Flores, supra note 52, at 63. “Acts that wrongfully allow one to have monetary gain 
or gain in property are criminal and are no less wrong because they were done for the sake 
of scientific research.” Id. 
108 Mahoney, supra note 27, at 175. 
109 Id. at 199. 
110 Id. at 170–71. 
111 Id. at 171. 
112 Id. at 171-72. 
113 Roberts, supra note 21, at 750. 
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term benefit bestowed upon the donor.”114 Pakistan has been dubbed a 
“kidney bazaar” because of its large numbers of impoverished donors. 
Recipients are likely pay $6000 to $12,000, but the donors may net, at 
most, about $2500.115 In India, there are reports of day laborers being 
initially promised work, but later duped or threatened at gunpoint to 
undergo transplant operations.116 The current global reality is that five 
to ten percent of kidney transplants performed annually are the result 
of organ trafficking, a business “based on despair.”117 
II 
THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR EFFECTIVE, BUT ETHICAL ORGAN 
POLICY 
The forces of supply and demand have fostered the growth of the 
black market and scientific misconduct.118 The low number of organs 
and high demand for transplants has created a “global market that 
involves physicians, researchers, and dealers in organs, into a very 
profitable criminal market.”119 The lack of safeguards encourages 
organ traffickers to exploit the poor and uneducated.120 The solution 
to this problem is not simply funding current programs, but is largely 
dependent on international laws to curb the market.121 Health 
authorities have been asked to update their legal frameworks to boost 
organ supply and curb illicit transplantation, but must do so within 
ethical boundaries.122 
 
114 Smith, supra note 34, at 373. Other major “recipient” nations include Australia, 
Canada, Israel, Japan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and EU countries. Shimazono, supra note 30, 
at 957; see also Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Prime Numbers: Organs Without Borders, 
FOREIGN POLICY, Jan.–Feb. 2005. Major “donor” nations include Pakistan, India, China, 
the Philippines, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, Iraq, Israel, Turkey, and the Republic of Moldova. 
Roberts, supra note 21, at 769. 
115 Smith, supra note 34, at 375. 
116 Id. 
117 Meyer, supra note 44, at 219. 
118 Flores, supra note 52, at 65. Demand is virtually guaranteed by the organ shortages 
across Europe and supply can be understood by viewing the living standards of those 
willing to sell their kidneys. For example, Moldova is the main donor country in Europe 
and, notably, also one of the poorest. Meyer, supra note 44, at 217. 
119 Flores, supra note 52, at 66. 
120 Id. at 65. 
121 Id. 
122 Shimazono, supra note 30, at 959–60. 
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A.  International Ban on Organ Sales 
As noted above, in 1984 the United States passed legislation 
banning payments for any organ used for transplantation.123 The 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, which set out laws for 
cadavers, did not state whether direct payments for organs were 
allowed, but the passage of NOTA in 1984 quickly brought that 
legislation in line with the current prohibition of organ sales.124 Since 
1984, only one amendment has been made to NOTA, and it served 
merely to expand the definition of a human organ.125 
Since the passage of NOTA, other countries have followed suit in 
prohibiting organ sales. For example, Germany’s organ transplant act 
explicitly states, “[t]rading in organs or tissue intended for use in the 
medical treatment of others is prohibited.”126 In 1994, India responded 
to international criticism of its transplantation practices by passing the 
Transplantation of Human Organs Act, which makes it illegal to sell 
non-vital organs.127 Thus, in the United States and many countries 
throughout the world, selling non-regenerative organs for monetary 
gain constitutes a serious criminal offense.128 The only nation that 
officially allows the buying and selling of organs for transplantation is 
Iran, which is host to a program that has been the recipient of both 
interest and condemnation.129 
 
123 National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1984) (amended 
2007) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise 
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the 
transfer affects interstate commerce.”). 
124 Mahoney, supra note 27, at 177–78; Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) of 1968, 
8A U.L.A. 63 (1993) (superseded by the UAGA of 1987); UAGA of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
273–274(f) (1994) (“A person may not knowingly, for valuable consideration, purchase or 
sell a part for transplantation or therapy, if removal of the part is intended to occur after 
the death of the decedent.”). 
125 Health Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, § 406, 102 Stat. 
3048, 3116 (1988); see also Elizabeth Pugliese, Organ Trafficking and the TVPA: Why 
One Word Makes a Difference in International Enforcement Efforts, 24 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 181, 195 (2008). 
126 TRANSPLANTATIONSGESETZ (TPG) [TRANSPLANTATION ACT], May 11, 1997, 
BGBL’I at § 17(1) (Ger.). 
127 Transplantation of Human Organs Act (India), supra note 37. 
128 Wancata, supra note 39, at 200. 
129 Delmonico, supra note 77, at 118; Paul Garwood, Dilemma Over Live-Donor 
Transplantation, 85 BULL. OF THE WHO 5, 6 (2007); J. Zargooshi, Iranian Kidney 
Donors: Motivations and Relations with Recipients, 165 J. OF UROLOGY 386 (2001); 
Stephen J. Dubner, Human Organs for Sale, Legally, in . . . Which Country?, N.Y. TIMES 
FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Apr. 29, 2008, 4:20 PM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com 
/2008/04/29. 
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However, the policy of outlawing incentives of any kind for organ 
procurement is now over twenty-five years old.130 While considered 
morally correct in 1984, the controversies surrounding the prohibition 
of valuable consideration for organ donation have reemerged as it 
becomes more apparent that wealthy citizens are evading their 
domestic systems in order to get organs from “death row inmates in 
China, street people in Brazil, and the poor in India.”131 International 
organizations have attempted to address the growing problem, but 
have largely relied on status quo principles with some evolving 
adjustments for incentives. 
The “international consensus” is that organs for transplantation 
“should not be sold,”132 but international organizations have grappled 
with whether or not incentives of some type should be allowed and to 
what degree. The World Health Organization (WHO) issued 
guidelines to avoid coercion and exploitation of donors in 1991; 192 
countries endorsed the guidelines, but they are non-binding and have 
largely been ignored.133 At a WHO consultation in Madrid in October 
of 2003, thirty-seven experts from twenty-three countries could not 
come to a consensus on how or where to draw the line between 
providing incentives and removing disincentives.134 The Fifty-
Seventh World Health Assembly in 2004 addressed the growing use 
of allogeneic transplantation and organ insufficiency by urging 
member states “to extend the use of living kidney donations . . . in 
addition to donations from deceased donors”.135 In May of 2010, the 
WHO’s revised guidelines were endorsed by the Sixty-Third World 
Health Assembly.136 Member states were encouraged to “promote the 
development of systems for the altruistic voluntary non-remunerated 
donation . . . and increase public awareness” of such systems.137 The 
WHO also reinforced its opposition to the “seeking of financial gain 
or comparable advantage in transactions involving human body 
parts.”138 However, the Guiding Principles also state that “[t]he 
 
130 Goodwin, supra note 46, at 208. 
131 Id. at 209. 
132 Smith, supra note 34, at 373. 
133 Forty-fourth World Health Assembly, Res. WHA44.25 (May 13, 1991); see also 
Smith, supra note 34, at 373. 
134 Nullis-Kapp, supra note 29, at 715. 
135 Fifty-seventh World Health Assembly, Res. WHA57.18, § (1)(5) (May 22, 2004). 
136 Sixty-third World Health Assembly, Res. WHA63.22 (May 21, 2010). 
137 Id. at § 2(2). 
138 Id. at § 2(3). 
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prohibition on sale or purchase of cells, tissues and organs does not 
preclude reimbursing reasonable and verifiable expenses incurred by 
the donor, including loss of income, or paying the costs of recovering, 
processing, preserving and supplying human cells, tissues or organs 
for transplantation.”139 Thus, some forms of compensation are 
allowed while outright sales are condemned. 
Professional organizations have also attempted to set standards in 
an effort to combat the illicit organ trade. In 2008, the Transplantation 
Society and International Society of Nephrology convened an 
International Summit on Transplant Tourism and Organ Trafficking 
in Istanbul, Turkey.140 The Istanbul Declaration calls for transplant 
commercialism, the buying and selling of organs, to be prohibited, 
citing Resolution 44.25 of the Forty-fourth World Health 
Assembly.141 It also carved out an exception for comprehensive 
reimbursement of donors, which “does not constitute a payment for 
an organ but is rather part of the legitimate costs of treating the 
recipient.”142 Stating that unethical practices, such as transplant 
tourism, are the “undesirable consequence of the global shortage of 
organs for transplantation,” the Declaration called for states to 
become domestically self-sufficient in organ donation rates and to 
enhance deceased donor programs to minimize the use of living 
donors.143 
Taking a more direct approach that same year, the American 
Medical Association specifically advocated for the modification of 
NOTA to rescind its prohibition of direct payments to donors, 
allowing for researchers to conduct pilot studies on the effectiveness 
of financial incentives on donation rates.144 
Following the United States, the Council of Europe established 
bans on organ sales in 1999.145 However, in 2009, the Council of 
 
139 WHO, WHO GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON HUMAN CELL, TISSUE AND ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION Guiding Principle 5 (as endorsed by the Sixty-third World Health 
Assembly, Res. WHA63.22 (May 21, 2010)) [hereinafter WHO GUIDING PRINCIPLES]. 
140 The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism, 3 
CLINICAL J. AM. SOC. NEPHROLOGY 1227, 1227 (2008). 
141 Id. at 1228. 
142 Id. at 1229 (allowing for reimbursement of “actual, documented costs of donating an 
organ”). 
143 Id. at 1227. 
144 AM. MED. ASS’N, DIRECTIVES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 153 (2008); see 
also Milot, supra note 95, at 1062. 
145 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of 
the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine, Council of Europe, Apr. 4, 1997, C.E.T.S. No. 164  
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Europe called for a binding international instrument that sets out the 
principle prohibiting financial gain from the human body and its 
parts.146 The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
adopted this principle in 1999, but by 2008 the convention had not 
been widely accepted beyond the European Union despite being open 
to any interested state.147 The Council places the utmost importance in 
this principle and declares that “[l]egislation on the recovery of 
organs . . . for transplantation should be passed in all countries and 
should conform to this principle”148 because such legislation is 
believed to protect the donation system based on altruism.149 
However, such judgment may be premature, since the debate on the 
effectiveness of the altruistic system is not as settled as these 
organizations’ efforts may present.150 
B.  The Procurement Debate and the Limits of Altruism 
With widespread organ shortages worldwide and the emergence of 
the black market in transplantations, the infallibility of the altruistic 
system has increasingly been the object of criticism. As one scholar 
stated, “[t]he moral certainty of altruism suffers if in the wake of its 
reach, thousands die each year and exponentially more suffer when a 
cure is in reach.”151 Thus, “[t]he significant risks of prolonged waits 
and the depleted quality of life for those waiting for kidneys, has 
 
(entered into force Dec. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights]. 
146 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 94. 
147 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 145. See also, Protocol 
to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Concerning Transplantation of 
Organs and Tissues of Human Origins, Council of Europe, Jan. 24, 2002, C.E.T.S. No. 
186 (entered into force May 1, 2006), art. 21. 25 [hereinafter Protocol to the Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine]. The Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origins 
reinforces this principle, but also allows for donors to be compensated for loss of earnings 
or other justifiable expenses associated with the procedure, as well as any damages 
incurred from the procedure that are not natural to transplantation. The Protocol only has 
twenty signatories, eight of which have ratified it. Id.  
148 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 94. 
149 Id. at 7. 
150 Nullis-Kapp, supra note 29, at 715 (“What is needed is a critical and thorough 
analysis of the different proposals that have been made particularly with regard to 
expanding the use of living donors, by providing incentives and/or removing 
disincentives.”) (quoting Dr. Nikola Biller-Andorino). 
151 Goodwin, supra note 46, at 214. 
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recalibrated the discourse around altruism and markets. We are forced 
to rethink the assumptions about what is morally correct to do.”152 
Over the past decade, significant debate has centered around the 
appropriateness of market-based procurement alternatives to deal with 
rampant organ shortages and the illicit organ trade.153 The American 
Medical Association (AMA) has called for the modification of current 
prohibitions in order to conduct pilot studies on the feasibility of a 
market-based procurement system.154 The British Transplantation 
Society, an opponent of a market system, still agrees that a public 
debate should occur over the merits and flaws of a market-based 
system.155 But the debate is not limited to highly-developed Western 
countries. For example, in Turkey, a well-known destination country 
for transplant tourism, there is a significant split within the medical 
community. Some doctors feel the life of the patient outweighs any 
ethical considerations, while others believe ethical limits are 
necessary to prevent other injustices.156 
Proponents of the current altruistic system vociferously oppose any 
form of direct payment to donors or any other arrangement that leads 
to monetary gain. Some scholars have posited that all body parts 
could be seen as so “integral to the [human] self” that they cannot be 
“vulgar, fungible market commodities,”157 and that “only those things 
inherently separate from the human self can be alienated from it.”158 
Thus, they believe that “‘once market value enters our discourse’ in 
regards to a certain object in the primary instance of sale, a slippery 
slope will result, and ‘market rhetoric will take over and characterize 
every [future] interaction in terms of market value.’”159 Therefore, 
profiteering from the human body must be banned and, as shown, this 
 
152 Id. at 208. 
153 For example, New Zealand has one of the lowest donor rates in the developed world 
and should “have the balls” to consider commercialization. Experts Advocate Controlled 
Sale of Organs, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, http://www.odt.co.nz/100752/experts 
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Group clinical director). 
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155 Lewis Smith, Sale of Human Organs Should be Legalised, Say Surgeons, 
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156 See generally Sanal, supra note 86. 
157 Wancata, supra note 39, at 203 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1906 (1987)). 
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thinking is engrained in many of the international, professional, and 
legal frameworks.160 The rationales for banning the sale of organs are 
that it could limit access to life-saving organs to only those who can 
afford them,161 it could lead to the exploitation of the desperate poor 
willing to sell,162 it would undermine the current altruistic system,163 
and it would degrade human dignity and freedom.164 Dabbling with 
profit-driven motivations is dangerous, for “[g]iven the life-or-death 
consequences of the procedure, organ donation should not be 
governed by the ethics of caveat emptor.”165 
The primary vehicle for procurement endorsed by altruists is 
cadaveric donations through presumed consent laws.166 Countries 
such as Belgium and Spain have long-standing presumed consent 
systems,167 and Spain is widely hailed as having one of the highest 
donation rates of any country.168 Regardless of the successes with 
presumed consent laws, most countries with that system still 
experience organ shortages.169 Other countries, such as the United 
States, have had limited success with presumed consent experiments 
because they run counter to the expectation of autonomy engrained in 
most segments of society.170 
 
160 See generally WHO GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 139; Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights supra note 145; Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine supra note 147, at art. 21; The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ 
Trafficking and Transplant Tourism, supra note 140. 
161 Delmonico et al., supra note 91, at 2004; see also Everton Bailey, Comment, Should 
the State Have Rights to Your Organs? Dissecting Brazil’s Mandatory Organ Donation 
Law, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 707, 716–17 (1998–1999); Garwood, supra note 
129, at 5. 
162 Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge Elîas, Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live 
and Cadaveric Organ Donations, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 21 (2007) (“If organ sales are 
permitted, the supply of human organs from living donors will come largely from the 
poorer segments of our society. Although some scholars argue that this concern is overly 
and needlessly paternalistic, poor people are often exploited in the United States and 
abroad.”); see also Budiani-Saberi & Delmonico, supra note 66, at 928; see also 
Delmonico et al., supra note 91, at 2004; Bailey, supra note 161, at 716–17. 
163 Budiani-Saberi & Delmonico, supra note 66, at 928. 
164 Delmonico et al., supra note 91, at 2004; see also Garwood, supra note 129, at 5; 
Meyer, supra note 44, at 228. 
165 Truog, supra note 28, at 446. 
166 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 32; see also Bailey, supra note 161, at 
711–18; Roberts, supra note 21, at 751. 
167 Roberts, supra note 21, at 761. 
168 Sanal, supra note 86, at 293; Garwood, supra note 129, at 5; Roberts, supra note 21, 
at 760. 
169 Roberts, supra note 21, at 761; Bailey, supra note 161, at 714. 
170 Delmonico et al., supra note 91, at 2002. 
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A stark example of this is Brazil. In 1997, after facing years of 
organ shortages, Brazil adopted presumed consent laws in an effort to 
increase cadaveric donations and reduce organ trafficking.171 
However, there was severe public outcry over the law.172 Opponents 
to the law feared that the law would disproportionately burden the 
poor and illiterate because they were the most likely to be unaware of 
their right to opt-out.173 The Federal Council on Medicine challenged 
the constitutionality of the bill on the grounds that the bill violates 
both the individual rights of citizens and medical ethics because it 
forces doctors to engage in practices that violate their consciences.174 
The law was subsequently repealed a year after its adoption.175 
Given that, despite the current system’s best efforts, organ 
shortages persist, there is growing acceptance of trial programs 
involving direct payments for organs.176 Proponents of market-based 
approaches believe that a myopic adherence to a purely altruistic 
system has hindered the success of organ procurement177 and severely 
limited the available options for addressing current procurement 
dilemmas.178 They attack the altruistic system on the grounds that it 
has simply failed to produce the promise its supporters espouse.179 
Although many altruists claim that the introduction of commercial 
activity into organ procurement would completely undermine the 
current altruistic system, proponents are quick to point out it is 
impossible to know what effect a regulated market would have 
without actual test markets.180 
 
171 Lei No. 9.434, de 4 de Fevereiro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
05.02.1997 (Braz.). See also Bailey, supra note 161, at 708 (“[u]nless manifestation of will 
to the contrary, in the scope of this Law, it is presumed that authorization is given for the 
donation of tissues, organs and human body parts for the purpose of transplantation or 
treatment of diseases”); Roberts, supra note 21, at 760. 
172 Roberts, supra note 21, at 760. 
173 Bailey, supra note 161, at 709. 
174 Id. at 710. 
175 Roberts, supra note 21, at 760. 
176 Smith, supra note 34, at 367. “The sale of human organs, once viewed as repugnant 
to most Americans, is becoming increasingly more acceptable. More scholars, physicians 
and policymakers are encouraging the development of a commercial market for human 
organs from living donors.” Id. at 362. 
177 Harris & Alcorn, supra note 27, at 223. 
178 Woan, supra note 27, at 424–25; see also Harris & Alcorn, supra note 27, at 223. 
179 Mahoney, supra note 27, at 217; see generally Woan, supra note 27. 
180 J.D. Jasper et al., Altruism, Incentives, and Organ Donation: Attitudes of the 
Transplant Community, 42 MED. CARE 378, 384 (2004); see also Mahoney, supra note 27, 
at 216. 
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The only market-based model to observe is Iran, which is the only 
country that allows for regulated kidney purchases, and where organ 
shortages are virtually nonexistent.181 Referred to as the “Iranian 
Model,” it is now widely known that regulation has not been 
realized.182 Secret payments from the recipient’s family to the donor’s 
broker are customary and well-known.183 Many of the donors express 
regret and shame for their decision and do not seek or receive follow-
up medical care.184 However, the Iranians readily admit that the 
project requires revision before it can be presented as a workable 
model for other countries.185 
Market-based proponents also point out that the altruistic 
procurement solutions are not without their own burdens as well. 
Altruism actually disproportionally burdens African-Americans, as 
they represent one-third of kidney waitlist patients but experience the 
highest death rate on transplantation lists.186 This is largely due to 
matching disparities in antigen distribution, a critical criterion.187 
Quite frankly, there are not enough altruistic donations of organs 
suitable for African-American matching—an issue that could be 
addressed through market inducements.188 Even presumed consent 
laws, which are commonly referred to as one solution for organ 
shortages, would disproportionally affect the poor and racial 
minorities because they are more likely to be uninformed of their 
option to opt out.189 
Finally, market-based proponents argue that the entire procurement 
system, not just the black market, is already completely 
commercialized.190 “[T]he debate over the commercialization of the 
human body is not about commercialization at all, but rather about 
 
181 Delmonico, supra note 77, at 118. “‘Although Iran clearly does not serve as a model 
for solving most of the world’s problems . . . its method for solving its organ shortage is 
well worth examining.’” Dubner, supra note 129 (quoting BENJAMIN E. HIPPEN, CATO 
INST., NO. 164, ORGAN SALES AND MORAL TRAVAILS: LESSONS FROM THE LIVING 
KIDNEY VENDOR PROGRAM IN IRAN 1 (2008), available at http://www.cato.org/pub 
_display.php?pub_id=9273). 
182 Delmonico, supra note 77, at 118. 
183 Id. 
184 Garwood, supra note 129, at 6. 
185 Delmonico, supra note 77, at 118. 
186 Goodwin, supra note 46, at 213. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 210–11. 
190 Mahoney, supra note 27, at 165. 
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how the financial benefits available will be apportioned.”191 Every 
step of the procurement process allows for compensation, except for 
the one that means the most—the actual donation of the organ. Both 
organ and tissue donors’ willingness to give may sometimes stem 
from the mistaken belief that their donation is not entering into a 
market.192 Their donations essentially are a gift to an intermediary, 
which is then sold as part of a package for transplant services. 
Mahoney asserts that “[t]he argument that patients pay only for 
medical treatment, and never for human organs, is no more persuasive 
than contending that restaurants sell not food, but only ‘dining 
services.’”193 Current legislation, as well as protocols and guidelines, 
provide for reasonable fees for medical staff, hospitals, and 
procurement agencies, but not directly to donors.194 “Reasonable” is a 
relative term, which allows these organizations and individuals to 
charge handsome prices for their services.195 Thus, in a system based 
on noncommodification, everyone gets paid but the donor, which 
does nothing to address the present reality that donors in many 
countries actively seek compensation for their “gift of life.” 
As the debate progressed over the past decade, there was some 
convergence surrounding incentives and compensation. While the 
altruistic system is still vigorously defended, many of its biggest 
proponents recognize that there needs to be some allowance for 
ethical incentives, or at least removing disincentives.196 Some of the 
suggestions for incentives, short of direct monetary payments to 
donors, include lifelong comprehensive health care,197 reimbursement 
of funeral expenses, medical leave for donors, priority on organ lists 
for previous donors, and donor insurance.198 Current international 
 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 194–95. 
193 Id. at 182. “One can argue that the organ is not sold, and that patients pay only for 
medical services, but in fact the services have no value without the organ, and patients 
have no opportunity to acquire organs in a separate transaction.” Id. 
194 See, e.g., Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987 § 10(b) (amended 2006); National 
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2008); WHO GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 139; Declaration of Istanbul, supra note 140, at 1229; Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 145, at art. 21. 
195 Roger W. Evans, Organ Procurement Expenditures and the Role of Financial 
Incentives, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3113, 3115–16; see also Mahoney, supra note 27, at 
180. 
196 Nullis-Kapp, supra note 29, at 715; see generally Delmonico et al., supra note 92. 
197 Smith, supra note 34, at 384. 
198 See Jasper et al., supra note 180, at 379; see generally Delmonico et al., supra note 
91. 
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proposals on transplantation policy include some form of indirect 
incentive for donors.199 Whether or not the incentive could ever allow 
for a direct payment to the donor is still contested, but it is 
acknowledged by market advocates that such payments cannot take 
place in an unregulated system and probably not on a wide scale.200 
The Council of Europe report seeks to finally solidify an 
international procurement system based on altruism,201 even in the 
midst of altruism’s resounding failure and rampant black markets.202 
The report focuses on the “commodification” of the human body and 
its parts and seeks a binding international agreement to solidify its 
norm, but the growth of the black market in organs has called the 
current norm into question.203 Whether or not an enforceable ban on 
commodification would be an effective tool to combat illicit 
transplantation practices is still unsettled. There has been scant 
research into public and professional opinions on incentives for organ 
donation and the initial research conducted shows that medical 
professionals are more receptive to the idea than altruists care to 
accept.204 Public and professional views on incentives should be 
assessed before the option is summarily dismissed.205 
While the Council of Europe searches for a binding international 
agreement, one such agreement already exists that is capable of 
addressing the most heinous aspects of the organ trade: the Additional 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
 
199 Declaration of Istanbul, supra note 140, at 1229; WHO GUIDING PRINCIPLES supra 
note 139; COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2. 
200 Goodwin, supra note 46, at 211 (“[M]arkets are not boundless, nor should we aim 
for them to operate as such.”). See also PEARSON, supra note 55 (arguing that for a 
regulated market system to succeed, clear guidelines must be strictly enforced and it 
should be a national system in line with the country’s cultural values); Smith, supra note 
155. 
201 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 7. “At United Nations level, there is 
no legally binding instrument which sets out the principle of the prohibition of making 
financial gains from the human body or its parts.” Id. at 94. 
202 Goodwin, supra note 46, at 209 (“[A] rigid prescription on altruism inspires the 
least favorable of markets: black and gray markets.”). 
203 Woan, supra note 27, at 432 (citations omitted) (“[T]he sale of organs is banned in 
almost every country and condemned by virtually all medical associations around the 
world. . . . [T]his should not be taken to mean that such an alternative is not worth 
exploring.”). 
204 Jasper et al., supra note 180, at 385. 
205 Id. at 379. 
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Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.206 
C.  Utilizing the Trafficking Protocol 
Although the Study considers trafficking in persons to be only a 
“marginal phenomenon” compared to the trafficking in human 
organs, tissues, and cells,207 this is only so if the referent object is the 
organ and not the donor. It is true that trade in organs, tissues, and 
cells is an enormously expansive and lucrative enterprise, engaged in 
by both legal and illicit organizations. If the referent object is the 
donor in these transactions and not the organ itself, then the question 
becomes whether or not the exchange took place with the full 
informed consent of the donor for a legal purpose. The world 
community has become aware that “the issue [is] exploitation.”208 
Focused on issues of exploitation and building upon the 
foundations of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime,209 the international community adopted the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking Persons.210 The 
Trafficking Protocol requires “a comprehensive international 
approach” that includes measures to prevent and punish human 
trafficking.211 Human trafficking includes the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons by coercive or 
deceptive means for exploitive purposes.212 One form of exploitation 
enunciated by the Trafficking Protocol is the removal of organs.213 
However, the definitions of exploitation are “a minimum,” allowing 
other elaborations of exploitation.214 Illicit conduct of biomedical 
research on a person,215 as well as removal of tissues and cells could 
be added to the definition.216 
 
206 G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (Nov. 15, 2000) (entered into force Dec. 25, 
2003); 2237 U.N.T.S. 319. 
207 COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY, supra note 2, at 93. 
208 Pugliese, supra note 125, at 189. 
209 Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at pmbl. 
212 Id. at art. 3(a). 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, MODEL LAW AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS, at 43, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.11, (2009). 
216 See Law No. 64 of 2010 (Regarding Combating Human Trafficking), Al-Jarida Al-
Rasmiyya, art. 2 (Egypt). The Trafficking Protocol simply uses the term “removal of  
2011] Organ Transploitation: A Model Law Approach 455 
to Combat Human Trafficking and Transplant Tourism 
Furthermore, the Trafficking Protocol is meant to supplement 
existing national legislation criminalizing human trafficking.217 The 
scope of its application appears to be limited to offenses 
“transnational in nature and involv[ing] an organized criminal 
group,”218 but other official interpretations require criminalization of 
trafficking acts regardless of location, movement, or parties 
involved.219 Utilizing the Trafficking Protocol in this manner finds its 
true value when addressing the common pathway of the organ black 
market: transplant tourism. 
Current practices usually involve patients from affluent countries 
with strong transplantation prohibitions skirting their systems by 
traveling to less regulated countries for transplantation procedures.220 
If crafted properly, a law based on the Trafficking Protocol could 
close that jurisdictional loophole. The Trafficking Protocol requires 
parties to “adopt or strengthen legislative or other measures . . . to 
discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of 
persons . . . that leads to trafficking.”221 If individuals participate in 
transplantation procedures involving exploited individuals, then they 
are to be held criminally liable under the protocol. Transplant tourism 
largely relies on donors who have been coerced or deceived into 
selling their organs, so such actions would have to be outlawed for a 
state to be in compliance with the protocol. Currently, the Trafficking 
Protocol has 143 parties that are bound to their obligations to 
criminalize trafficking practices and are regularly evaluated on their 
progress.222 The adjustment of an existing framework as broad as the 
Trafficking Protocol has a greater chance of success due to 
preexisting standards, monitoring, and support. 
 
organs,” which could be expanded to include tissues and cells for a more comprehensive 
definition. See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 3(a). 
217 Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6, at Art. 9(5). 
218 Id. at art. 4. 
219 MODEL LAW AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 215, at 7. See also, 
Janie Chuang, Beyond a Snapshot: Preventing Human Trafficking in the Global Economy, 
13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 137, 152 (2006) (‘“The movement of [a] person to [a] 
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(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 
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222 Id. 
456 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 13, 427 
The Council of Europe wishes to address the illicit trade in organs, 
tissues, and cells in order to prevent any transplantation activity not 
founded on the principles of non-commodification and altruism. Even 
if a universal agreement on what constitutes an acceptable incentive 
could be achieved, it is doubtful that such an altruistic system could 
stem the illicit activity it inadvertently helped spawn. The 
procurement debate shows that despite attempts to solidify altruism as 
the cornerstone of international donation regimes, the organ shortages 
continue unabated, and more creative solutions need to be encouraged 
through open discourse and experimentation. 
This is not to say that market-based solutions are boundless. In the 
midst of the procurement debate are people dying every day from 
organ failure and others being exploited mercilessly for their “gift of 
life.” What is needed is flexible, but effective legislative and law 
enforcement action. In order to gain this flexibility, the central 
concern should not be the status of the organ, but the means by which 
an entity came into possession of it. Illicit transplantation and tissue 
procurement preys upon vulnerable individuals through coercion and 
deceit.223 If the organ or tissue was procured from a person using any 
of the means enunciated in the Trafficking Protocol, then it is human 
trafficking for organ removal, and the member states are obligated to 
combat it. 
Acts that promote human trafficking, including trafficking for 
organ removal, need to be effectively criminalized in order to close 
any loopholes in enforcement. Chief amongst these loopholes is 
transplant tourism, which allows wealthy individuals to evade 
legitimate procurement regimes, expose poor individuals in weak 
procurement regimes to extreme forms of exploitation, and then 
return home with impunity. Meaningful public discourse and 
procurement reform will not be explored as long as wealthy 
individuals, who can arguably exert the most pressure on political 
factors, are allowed to simply avoid the debate by traveling overseas 
for a quick and callous solution. Any proposed legal reform must 
deter states’ own citizens from feeding the global black market, but 
allow for innovative, domestic solutions to the organ shortage crisis. 
An international system that allows for only altruistic methods and 
shuts out any innovation will not accomplish justice for the exploited 
and will only fuel the black market. The Trafficking Protocol is well-
 
223 “The appellant has peddled deceit, trafficked in organs and profiteered from 
misery.” Wang Chin Sing v. Public Prosecutor [2008] 1 SLR(R) 870 (Singapore). 
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established and can provide flexible legislation, as well as necessary 
action on transplant tourism. 
The following section provides a model law utilizing the 
Trafficking Protocol and is accompanied by some explanatory 
sections. The model law is to be interpreted in conjunction with the 
Model Law against Trafficking in Persons developed by the 
UNODC.224 The UNODC’s model law is sufficiently comprehensive 
for legislating anti-trafficking laws, but was silent on specific 
provisions concerning trafficking for organ removal. Therefore, the 
model law developed for this paper is meant to provide those absent 
provisions. 
III 
MODEL LAW UNDER THE PROTOCOL 
With the procurement debate far from settled and organ shortages 
dominating most developed countries, a more flexible approach to an 
internationally binding instrument to combat trafficking for organ 
removal should be explored. Contrary to the Council of Europe’s call 
for an instrument that flatly prohibits monetary incentives for 
procurement, national legislation based on the Trafficking Protocol 
can be easily adjusted to encompass both the removal of organs as 
exploitation and the criminalization of transplant tourism as an act 
that promotes trafficking. An example of such a law is as follows: 
I. Definitions 
“Trafficking in persons for removal of organs, tissues, or cells” 
means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt 
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power 
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.225 
“Exploitation” means the removal of human organs, tissues or cells 
for 
(a) transplantation into another person, or 
(b) biomedical research and development; 
 
224 MODEL LAW AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 215. 
225 Adapted from: Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, Rep. Act No. 9208, art. 2,  
§ 3(c) (June, 21 2009) (Phil.) [hereinafter Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act]. 
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in order to derive any benefit, monetary or otherwise, from the 
transaction. 
“Transplant tourism” means an individual traveling outside their 
country of permanent residence for the purpose of undergoing an 
organ transplantation procedure and the organ donor is: 
(a) a foreign national, and 
(b) not genetically related to the recipient.226 
“Permanent residence” means a person’s true, fixed, and permanent 
home and principal establishment, and that person has the intention 
of returning to it whenever they are absent therefrom. 
(a) No one factor, not even place of voting registration, or a 
declaration of domicile or residence made for official purposes, 
is controlling. 
(b) Statements of intention may carry considerable weight, but 
will not prevail over contrary facts evidencing actual intent. 
(c) Influential factors are inter alia the place where civil and 
political rights are exercised, taxes paid, real and personal 
property located, driver’s and other licenses obtained, bank 
accounts maintained, location of club and church membership 
and places of business and employment. 
II. Offenses 
(1) Transplant Tourism 
The following shall constitute the crime of transplant 
tourism:227 
A. Traveling with the Intent to Engage in Transplant 
Tourism 
A person who travels outside their country of permanent 
residence with the intent to engage in a transplant 
procedure shall be fined and imprisoned for up to 
[duration]. The penalty shall include forfeiture of travel 
documents and any property used or intended to be used to 
commit or promote commission of the offense. 
B. Traveling and Engaging in Transplant Tourism 
 
226 Some experts assert that travel for transplantation can be ethical if: (1) the recipient 
has duel citizenship and undergoes a transplantation procedure with a family member is a 
country of citizenship that is not their residence; or (2) the donor and recipient are 
genetically related and wish to undergo transplantation in a country not of their residence. 
See Delmonico, supra note 78, at 117. 
227 The following section was adapted from parts of the Prosecutorial Remedies and 
Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act) OF 2003 , Pub. L. 
No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (effective Apr. 30, 2003). The PROTECT Act criminalized 
child sex tourism and is an apt framework for transplant tourism legislation. 
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A person who travels outside their country of permanent 
residence and engages in an organ transplantation 
procedure with a foreign citizen shall be fined and 
imprisoned for up to [duration]. The penalty shall include 
forfeiture of travel documents and any property used or 
intended to be used to commit or promote commission of 
the offense. The organ itself shall not be considered 
property subject to forfeiture. 
C. Attempt and Conspiracy 
Attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime of transplant 
tourism is punished with the same penalty provided for 
commission of the crime of transplant tourism. 
(2) Transplant Tourism as a Form of Trafficking in Persons 
It shall be considered an act of trafficking in persons when a 
person undertakes tours and travel plans consisting of tourism 
packages or activities utilizing a foreign citizen for organ 
transplantation. 
(3) Liability of Corporate Persons 
Any legal person directing, organizing, promoting, procuring, 
or facilitating the travel of a person with the knowledge that 
such a person will engage in transplant tourism shall be liable. 
Penalties include closure of business, withdrawing of licenses 
or authorizations, and freezing or confiscation of proceeds of 
the crime. 
(4) Liability for Medical Professionals 
Any medical establishment, attending physician, or medical 
practitioner who has any knowledge of or learns of facts or 
circumstances that give rise to a reasonable belief that a person 
has engaged in transplant tourism shall immediately report the 
same, either orally or in writing, to law enforcement. Failure to 
do so shall be a ground for an administrative proceeding, 
without prejudice to criminal liability under the Act, if 
evidence warrants.228 
A.  Core Concepts 
The above law is merely a suggestion for possible language to 
criminalize transplant tourism and combat human trafficking for 
organ removal, but it is based on the central principles of the 
Trafficking Protocol: the means used for exploitation and consent. 
According to the Trafficking Protocol, if any of the “means” elements 
 
228 Adapted from: Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, supra note 224, at art. 4, § 13. 
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are present, then a victim’s consent is irrelevant.229 In the context of 
medical procedures, the consent of a victim would be irrelevant 
because “[a]n uninformed decision to follow the recommendation or 
suggestion of a medical professional is in effect a choice coerced by 
the medical professional.”230 American courts have also held that 
consent cannot exist when valuable information is withheld from the 
patient.231 Securing consent without providing the patient with 
adequate information constitutes redressable negligence232 and 
surgery without informed consent has long been recognized as 
battery.233 
When a patient has given full informed consent, three main 
elements are present: disclosure, capacity, and voluntariness.234 The 
duty of disclosure arises from an individual’s right to self-
determination, which requires one to know the truth and receive all 
information related to the decision.235 A “reasonable patient” standard 
is applied and looks to what a reasonable patient would want to know 
in order to make an informed medical decision. This usually centers 
on the procedure being fully explained, as well as disclosing any 
anticipated risks and consequences.236 
Capacity refers to a patient’s ability to understand information 
related to a proposed procedure and fully appreciate the consequences 
 
229 Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 3(b) (“The consent of a victim of 
trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this 
article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been 
used. . . . . ”). The “means” in subparagraph (a) are: the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or a position of 
vulnerability, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve consent of a 
person having control over another person. 
230 J. Steven Svoboda et al., Informed Consent for Neonatal Circumcision: An Ethical 
and Legal Conundrum, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 61, 66 (2001) (emphasis 
added). 
231 Keogan v. Holy Family Hospital, 622 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Wash. 1980) (finding if the 
physician has not given the patient all the information that a patient needs to make a 
knowledgeable decision regarding the medical care, any consent the patient gives is 
ineffectual). 
232 Svoboda et al., supra note 230, at 64. 
233 Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115–16 (Del. 1991) (holding that an 
operation without informed consent constituted battery). 
234 Svoboda et al., supra note 230, at 64. For a more in-depth elaboration, see, 
University of Washington School of Medicine, Informed Consent: Ethical Topic in 
Medicine, ETHICS IN MEDICINE, http://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/consent.html 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2011). 
235 Svoboda et al., supra note 230, at 64. 
236 Id. at 66. 
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of their decision.237 This requirement “reflects the belief that persons 
unable to make rational decisions about their medical care should be 
protected from making decisions that are harmful or that they would 
not make if they were able.”238 
Voluntariness means that patients are able to exercise their right to 
make healthcare decisions free from manipulation and undue 
influence.239 Manipulation can occur through distortion or omission of 
information in order to induce a specific choice by the patient.240 
Furthermore, the danger of undue influence is especially acute in light 
of the power imbalance between doctor and patient.241 Presumed 
undue influence can be established by a showing that there was a 
relationship of trust and confidence between the victim and the 
defendant of such a nature that it is fair to presume the wrongdoer 
abused that relationship in order to compel the victim into the 
impugned transaction. Once a confidential relationship has been 
established, the burden shifts to the wrongdoer to show the victim 
entered into the transaction freely (possibly by showing the victim 
had independent advice). Certain relationships, as a matter of law, 
raise the presumption that undue influence has been exercised, such 
as those between lawyer and client or doctor and patient.242 
In the context of transplant tourism, it is easy to see that informed 
consent in many cases is either defective or wholly lacking. As 
discussed above, many donors in developing countries are assured by 
recruiters and medical personnel that the transplantation procedure 
will have little impact on their future health.243 However, as a result of 
the surgery, many are left unable to walk, run, or work.244 In some 
studies, more than eighty-five percent reported their health declined 
after the donation and almost eighty percent recommended against 
donating a kidney.245 At some point, many of the donors in poor 
countries are acquired through means of fraud, deception, and abuse 
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of a position of power—all key “means” elements of the Trafficking 
Protocol. 
The most prevalent “means” element utilized by traffickers is also 
the most opaque: the abuse of a position of vulnerability. While there 
are currently some experts attempting to clarify how this element is 
being defined,246 an applied standard is far from being achieved. 
Often, “vulnerable victim” is narrowly defined as “a victim who is 
unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who 
is otherwise particularly susceptible to criminal conduct.”247 
However, vulnerability has been expanded in some jurisdictions to 
include states of poverty and economic desperation.248 “Abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability” was not defined in the 
Trafficking Protocol and the Travaux Préparatoires shows that the 
exact meaning was disputed during the drafting of the protocol.249 
However, the Travaux Préparatoires does include an interpretive note 
stating that the abuse of a position of vulnerability “is understood as 
referring to any situation in which the person involved has no real or 
acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved.”250 Other 
approaches have associated vulnerability to linguistic barriers, social 
isolation, physical disability, or a precarious financial, psychological 
or social situation.251 
Looking at organ donors in impoverished countries, one has to be 
mindful of whether or not they may be able to truly make a fully 
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autonomous decision to undergo the transplantation procedure, even 
if they technically understand the nature and consequences of the 
procedure. It has been stated that poverty is living “without 
fundamental freedoms of action and choice,”252 so consent given free 
from all forms of coercion may be impossible for many donors 
involved in transplant tourism. This is where the nexus between 
transplant tourism and trafficking for organ removal is most apparent. 
Instances where the donors are blatantly deceived and defrauded are 
obvious cases of human trafficking for organ procurement, but many 
of the procedures may simply be the product of the desperate poor 
doing what is necessary to free themselves of poverty’s shackles.253 
Individuals engage in this type of risky behavior for money frequently 
and in many widely accepted professions. Therefore, the ethical lines 
of incentivized procurement should be left to the individual states to 
decide for themselves. As discussed, organ shortages are a major 
global problem and possible solutions have to be culturally 
conducive, or, as in the case of Brazil’s presumed consent law, they 
will inevitably fail. 
B.  Pragmatic Enforcement 
The most practical solution at the moment is to criminalize 
transplant tourism, especially in the wealthiest and most developed 
countries. Currently, trafficking for organ removal is driven by organ 
shortages in developed countries and weak enforcement in less 
developed countries.254 The reality is that many of the transplant 
tourism destinations lack adequate laws and enforcement mechanisms 
to regulate the practice.255 These countries, as ratifiers of the 
Trafficking Protocol, are equally obligated to accomplish meaningful 
anti-trafficking measures, but in the ocean of the various trafficking 
initiatives (forced labor, sex slavery, etc.), they simply do not have 
the resources or capacity to police strict organ procurement regimes. 
Since the key recipient countries of international organ procedures are 
largely Western or wealthy countries, the burden should initially fall 
on them to stem their citizens’ engagement in transplant tourism. 
Most recipients of foreign transplantation procedures will require 
follow-up care with their domestic medical physician at some point, 
 
252 WORLD BANK, Attacking Poverty, in WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1 (2001). 
253 Shimazono, supra note 30, at 958; see also Bramstedt & Xu, supra note 4, at 1699. 
254 Kalogjera, supra note 46, at 21; see also Chuang, supra note 219, at 144. 
255 Kalogjera, supra note 46, at 21. 
464 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 13, 427 
so there is a natural bottleneck in the process that would allow for 
easier law enforcement monitoring. That is why the clause mandating 
reporting of local medical staff to law enforcement is so critical to the 
viability of stemming trafficking cases. While some medical 
professionals may decry doctor-patient confidentiality, disclosure for 
suspected criminal behavior is already widely practiced in emergency 
rooms across the United States.256 Furthermore, the health risks posed 
to the general public by recipients returning from overseas justifies 
stiffer medical responsibility.257 
CONCLUSION 
Human trafficking for organ removal is the product of decades of 
myopic organ procurement legislation and the resulting procurement 
shortages. In response, a large black market in organ procurement 
emerged and is supported by deception and desperation. The 
difficulty with this form of organized crime is that at some point in 
the process all of the parties involved, including the victims, have 
benefited from illicit activity and violated the law in one form or 
another.258 Another difficulty is that sufficient enforcement of anti-
trafficking legislation will probably collide with medical regulations 
such as doctor-patient confidentiality and inaccessibility of medical 
records.259 Even though there are obvious trafficking “bottlenecks” at 
capable medical facilities, which should intuitively make 
investigation easier, it is very difficult in practice to trace medical 
histories of recipients and data from the institutions performing the 
procedures.260 
Criminalization of trafficking for organ removal must come first, 
but will not solve the problem alone because the root of the illicit 
trade is disparity in living standards.261 There is no comprehensive 
effort to address the root cause of poverty and short-term strategies of 
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public awareness are employed.262 There are limits to strictly “law 
and order” approaches to trafficking. Addressing poverty, 
unemployment, and other factors that increase an individual’s 
vulnerability to trafficking requires creative and long-term 
approaches.263 
The purpose of this Note is to propose a “law and order” approach 
that utilizes current international law, but remains flexible enough to 
allow for more organic, regional solutions to emerge. Countries, such 
as the United States, could take an active role in discouraging its 
citizens from engaging in transplant tourism by amending their 
national legislation to criminalize the practice and include both 
criminal and civil penalties; sanction other countries that permit and 
perform transplants for their citizens; and pursue new methods of 
organ procurement.264 
Other measures can also have a solid impact on the matter as well. 
For example, it has been suggested that although NOTA only 
criminalizes the sale and purchase of human organs within the United 
States, the statute could be interpreted to include sales and purchases 
by U.S. citizens overseas.265 Thus, a de facto outlaw of transplant 
tourism would be in effect for Americans. Other scholars have 
suggested that the Federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA), the central anti-trafficking legislation in the United States, 
could be amended to include trafficking for organ removal in its 
definition of human trafficking in order to bring it into accord with 
the Trafficking Protocol.266 The TVPA created Trafficking in Persons 
Report, released by the U.S. State Department, is a major influence on 
international efforts against human trafficking because nations 
wishing to avoid being listed on the Special Watch List are more 
inclined to invest in TVPA definitions of trafficking.267 
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Ideally, the real solution is preventing people from having kidney 
failure in the first place through good medical care.268 However, in the 
meantime, the major “recipient” countries must do what they can to 
close the transplant tourism loopholes in their own system and all 
countries must have the flexibility to explore procurement regimes, 
even if that means testing out market-based solutions. The Trafficking 
Protocol provides an established framework of binding international 
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